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FAMILY LAW

The Hendershott ruling
When mediation runs into domestic violence
given this minimal “reason to suspect” standard – a standard
akin to that which obligates teachers and doctors to investigate
amily law cases with a history of domestic violence can- abuse – a district court had no discretion, as here, to specially
tailor a process by which to mitigate such issues.7
not be mediated, the Montana Supreme Court has held.
The Court also noted a discrepancy between §40-4-301(2)
In a case of first impression, a unanimous Montana
and MCA §40-4-219, which applies to mediation of parenting
Supreme Court held in April that MCA §40-4-301(2) bars displan amendments, and provides an exception only in cases of
trict courts in family law proceedings “from authorizing or
physical abuse; §40-4-301(2) includes emotional as well as
continuing mediation of any kind where there is a reason to
physical abuse.8 Finally, the Court observed that §40-4-301(2)
suspect emotional, physical, or sexual abuse.”1
prohibits the use of alternative dispute resolution generally,
The ruling shows great sensitivity
arguably expanding the statute to cover
to a problem that has reached crisis
not only mediation but settlement conproportions in Montana and the rest
The Montana Supreme Court’s
ferences as well9 – “the hot-button
of the country, and it very well may
issue,”
Monte Jewell, who represented
be the broadest exception to courtdecision may well be the broadHeidi Hendershott, tells us, as many
mandated family mediations to date.2
est exception to court-mandated practitioners insist that settlement conThe challenge now is to ensure that
ferences are not mediations. That may be
family mediations to date.
the decision is implemented
so. But the decision referred not only to
statewide. The courts, bar, mediators,
mediation but to “alternative dispute resand domestic-violence advocates
olution,”10 which may include settlement
must collaborate to create a protocol
conferences. This broader import of Hendershott may impose
and mechanism by which to screen such cases. This means
a greater task on district courts.
outreach and training.
The decision strikes a welcome balance between the promSince mediation is meant to empower parents to freely
design arrangements best suited to their family’s specific needs ise of mediation and the realities of domestic violence. The
court is, more often than not, an inappropriate venue for famil– an aim compromised by many, but not all, instances of
ial dispute – hence the routine referral of parenting cases to
domestic abuse – Montana ought to consider a way by which
mediation. At the same time, domestic violence often robs
parties can opt into an alternative dispute-resolution process.
victims of meaningful choice – a fundamental requirement of
Hendershott v. Westphal involved a Flathead County
mediated agreement. By recognizing that mediation must be
District Court’s approval of a parenting plan that included a
consensual, that is, free from any physical or emotional coermandatory mediation provision. Heidi Hendershott appealed,
cion attending domestic abuse, the court protects domestic viociting MCA §40-4-301(2), which states that:
lence victims and the mediation process.11
The Court may not authorize … mediated negotiations if
BUT THIS IS JUST the first step. There very well may be
the court has reason to suspect that one of the parties . . .
has been physically, sexually, or emotionally abused by the instances in which mediation can empower domestic violence
victims. Experts distinguish among four general types of
other party.3
domestic abuse:
 Battering situations characterized by coercive control
Hendershott argued that the District Court had reason to
through violent behavior and other abuse.
suspect physical and emotional abuse. She submitted an affi Situations characterized more by a batterer’s weak
davit stating that she and her children had suffered escalating
impulse control, influenced perhaps by concurrent alcohol or
incidents of emotional and physical abuse from Jesse
chemical abuse.
Westphal.4 At trial, two psychologists also testified that
 Situations involving self-defense by the victim.
Hendershott exhibited traits of an abused woman.5
 Isolated acts of violence that do not allow one party to
The Montana Supreme Court agreed, holding that the
coercively control the other.
District Court erred as a matter of law for failing to apply
Chronic battering situations are clearly inappropriate for
MCA §40-4-301(2).6 The evidence before the District Court
mediation – and these situations are likely what the Legislature
showed enough reason to suspect emotional abuse, the
and Supreme Court had in mind in carving out the exception.
Supreme Court found. And as an absolute bar to mediation
By Eduardo R.C. Capulong & Karen Alley
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But what about the other situations? Can’t mediation actually
provide an empowering forum for victims under these circumstances?
The answer is, of course: it depends. As a threshold matter,
courts and mediators must be able to distinguish among these
four situations. Cases involving chronic battering are never
appropriate for mediation. As for cases involving poor impulse
control, self-defense, and more isolated acts of violence, district courts may need to decide their propriety for mediation ad
hoc. This means training – for judges, court personnel, mediators, attorneys and survivors. In such instances, appreciating
the complexities of domestic violence and advantages of mediation may call for an opt-in process.
IT IS NOT CLEAR from Hendershott or the legislative
history of §40-4-301(2) if a survivor can opt-in to mediation.
Under an opt-in provision, a survivor would be able to decide
whether or not to mediate after orientation on the nature of
domestic violence, mediation, and litigation. Because survivors are most familiar with their own situations, they ought
to be given the opportunity to choose the forum in which to
assert their claims.12
Several states allow victims to opt in to mediation under
certain circumstances. Those circumstances include cases in
which:
 The survivor voluntarily chooses or proposes mediation.
 There is an available mediator trained in the way domestic violence affects a survivor.
 The survivor has a support person (either an attorney or
a victim’s advocate).
 The mediation is specially structured to ensure the survivor’s safety.13
Some states also require courts or mediation centers to
adopt a screening protocol.14 Such a protocol is meant to help
courts and mediators evaluate whether domestic violence has
occurred and, if so, of what nature. Screening protocols also
could help assess whether a survivor is able to mediate or falls
into the category of “battered,” rendering mediation inappropriate. Under these statutes, the screening process is multitiered, requiring both the courts’ staff and the mediator to
screen parties. In such processes, both parties should be carefully questioned about whether there is a history of domestic
violence, the extent of the violence, and whether the survivor,
in particular, feels able to communicate with her former partner. Where the mediator is involved in screening parties, the
mediator can determine how to structure the mediation to best
meet the needs of the survivor, if the survivor chooses to
mediate.
All states that allow for a survivor to opt-in to mediation
require that the mediator be specially trained to understand the
subtle dynamics at play in domestic violence cases. The mediator must be able to understand the psychological impact of
domestic violence on a survivor, as well as be able to recognize nonverbal cues that the abuser may use to control the victim. Further, the mediator needs sufficient training to understand how to balance the power between the parties.
IF NOTHING ELSE, Hendershott presents us with the
opportunity to educate each other about domestic violence.
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How are such cases different from “high-conflict” situations –
so often the paradigm through which courts and mediators
analyze and resolve family disputes? Which cases should
courts decide and, if so, how? Beyond the assumption that
courts are better equipped to handle cases of domestic violence, how are survivors actually treated? (Here, we need to
assess empirically the oft-idealized nature of litigation.)
Which cases, if any, can mediators handle and, if so, how?
Courts and mediators cannot do this alone. Advocates not
only need to get involved in screening for domestic violence
cases and training judges, court personnel, attorneys and mediators; they also need to help survivors through any mediation
process through their perspective, resources and support.
Hendershott reaffirms that domestic violence is a matter of
public concern. As critics have long contended, mediation can
re-privatize this important social problem by its private, informal, confidential nature. To adequately address domestic violence and at the same time remain true to the promise of selfdetermination through mediation and alternative dispute resolution, we must design and implement systems equal to the letter and spirit of this important ruling.
EDUARDO CAPULONG is a member of the Bar, associate
professor of Law, and director of the Mediation Clinic at the
University of Montana School of Law. KAREN ALLEY is a
graduating law student and intern at the school’s Mediation
Clinic.

NOTES
1. Hendershott v. Westphal, 2011 MT 73 ¶ 31 [hereinafter Hendershott].
2. Colin Miller, FeministLawProfessors.com, “Exception(al) Opinion: Supreme
Court of Montana Opinion Might Mean Montana Has Broadest Abuse Exception
to Court-Ordered Mediation,” www.feministlawprofessors.com/2011/05/excep
tional-opinion-supreme-court-of-montana-opinion-might-mean-montana-hasbroadest-abuse-exception-to-court-ordered-mediation/ (last visited May 18, 2011).
The Montana Attorney General’s office notes that the “rate of domestic abuse in
Montana has remained unacceptably high. The rate of domestic violence offenses reported to law enforcement in … 2007 was 462 reported domestic violence
offenses for every 100,000 people. Each year, approximately five out of every
1,000 Montanans are victims of reported cases of domestic violence - and that
doesn’t include those who don’t seek help and suffer in silence.”
www.doj.mt.gov/victims/domesticviolence.asp (last visited May 19, 2011).
3. Emphasis is ours.
4. Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 3.
5. Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 11.
6. Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 32.
7. Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 31.
8. Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 33.
9. Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 32.
10. Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 32.
11. We do note with dismay, however, the Court’s rejection of Hendershott’s
argument that mediation can only be authorized “only where both parties consent.” Hendershott, supra note 1 at ¶ 21.
12. Aimee Davis, “Mediating Cases Involving Domestic Violence: Solution or
Setback?,” 8 Cardozo J. Conflict Res. 253, 272 (2006).
13. See, e.g., Alabama Code § 6-6-20; Alaska Stat. § 25,24,060; Hawaii Rev.
Stat. § 580-41.5; Kentucky Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.036; New Mexico Stat. An. § 404-8; 12 Oklahoma Stat. Ann. §§ 1801-1813; Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-4-131.
This list is not exhaustive but is representative of states with an opt-in provision.
14. See Alabama Code § 6-6-20; Alaska Stat. ¶ 25,20,808; Oregon
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